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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we present a method for the construction of 8 × 8 substitution boxes used
in the area of cryptography. A symmetric group permutation S8 is applied on Galois field
elements that originally belong to GF(28), and as a consequence, 40320 new substitution
boxes are synthesized. The Liu J substitution box is used as a seed in the creation process
of the new algebraically complex nonlinear components. The core design of this new
algorithm relies on the symmetric group permutation operation which is embedded in the
algebraic structure of the new substitution box. We study the characteristics of the newly
created substitution boxes and highlight the improved performance parameters and their
usefulness in practical applications. In particular, we focus on the nonlinear properties and
the behavior of input/output bits and determine the suitability of a particular substitution
box for a specific type of encryption application. A comparison with some of the prevailing
and popular substitution boxes is presented.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is one of the most popular and effective symmetric-key algorithms used in
various cryptography applications. This standard has been formally accepted by theNational Institute of Standards (NIST) [1]
since October 2000. The original designers of this encryptionmethod, Joan Deamen and Vincent Rijmen (named as Rijndael),
submitted the designwith other algorithms for review,which later on resulted in its selection. The encryption process in this
algorithm is supplemented with a nonlinear component capable of creating confusion ability in the ciphertext. The design
of the nonlinear component, called a substitution box (S-box), is of great interest to cryptanalysts, as the understanding
of its functionality yields insight into the encryption process and its characteristics. The study of structural properties of
S-boxes, which play an important role in the analysis of their behavior, has resulted in some useful descriptions [2]. A
rigorous algebraic analysis of the S-box is found in [3] and reveals its design properties and construction methodology. The
S-boxes are also described with the use of polynomials and the analysis shows that the original AES S-box comprises only
nine terms. The sparse characteristics embedded in the S-box render the cipher vulnerable to algebraic and interpolation
attacks. In recent years, researchers have been focusing on the design and development of methods that increase the degree
of the polynomials describing the S-box. In an effort to increase the number of terms in the algebraic expression for the
polynomial description, a new S-box with 255 terms is originated by manipulating the original linear mapping and inverse
mapping in the design of the AES S-box [4]. In [5], the authors present a new method for synthesizing the S-box with a
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comparable number of polynomial terms, that is, close to 255. Although the new S-box has an affine mapping, the original
AES S-box can be reused and the number of terms is restricted to 253. A new S-box structure is presented in [6] with a
complex algebraic expression, easy to realize, and suitable for digital communication system and device use. The binary Gray
codes are used to further strengthen the existing AES S-box, and as a consequence, the number of terms in the polynomial
approaches the limit of 255. Similarly, in [7], the authors propose a new method for constructing multiple secure keys. The
new S-box incorporates all the properties from the original structure.
In this work, we enhance the Liu J S-boxes by applying permutations of the symmetric group S8 with the order of
40320 [8]. The newmethod can construct 40320 unique S8 Liu J S-boxes. In order to determine the strength of the proposed
S-boxes, several statistical analyses are performed. The most important information about the cipher is its nonlinear
characteristics, which are calculated using the nonlinearity test. Additional tests are performed to test the independence
of input/output bits. Further tests are performed to test the ability of the cipher to resist linear approximation. The changes
in bit patterns at different stages are critically analyzed in order to study the avalanche characteristics. These tests are applied
to the proposed S8 Liu J S-boxes, and to some commonly used S-boxes, used as benchmarks.
The proposed S-box synthesis process is suitable for high speed communication because of the faster implementation and
high cardinality. The supply of new S-boxes is hampered by the complex reconfigurations needed at the time of synthesis,
and in the applications to real time systems, the performance, speed and ease of implementation are compromised [9].
However, in hardware implementations of encryption systems, achieving the flexibility to modify the structure of the S-box
on the fly is a challenging task and requires complex computation systems operating at high speed [10,11].
2. Algebraic expressions for S-boxes
It is vital to explore the algebraic expressions for Liu J S-boxes and study the construction process in detail to provide
insight into the synthesis process. The transformation of the AES S-box is based on exclusive-OR (XOR) operations and its
order can be represented as XORConst(BitLinear(ByteInverse(x))), over GF(2n). The choices of affine transformation and
irreducible polynomial do not influence the number of terms in the AES S-box, and naturally result in an expression with
nine terms.
In order to avoid additional processing delays in high speed communication systems, the real challenge is to improve
the algebraic complexity while keeping the implementation process as simple as possible. Keeping in view the complexity
constraints in the AES implementations, we propose a new method for the synthesis of the substitution box with more
complex algebraic structure and simple implementation. The enhancement in the design renders the new S-box more
resistant to differential cryptanalysis attacks. The proposed method can be summarized by the following three steps:
Step 1: z = Bitlinear(y) = An×n(yn−1, yn−2, L, y0).
Step 2: u = ByteInverse(z).
Step 3: y = XORConst(x) = x⊕ 0x63.
The process of construction of the new S-box is presented in Section 3.
3. Construction of S8 Liu J S-boxes
The proposed algorithmuses the application of the symmetric group actionmethod to the Liu J S-boxes [7,8]. Thismethod
relies on the permutation operation of symmetric group S8 on the elements of S-boxes. The procedure begins with the
selection of a Liu J S-box and conversion of its elements into binary format. The elements in binary form are processed by the
action of permutations of the symmetric group S8, which results in 40320 newS-boxes and is shown in Fig. 1. The scrambling
ability can be further enhanced by selecting those permutation operations which involve multiple stages. Although the use
of these operations is desirable in increasing complexity, the implementation procedure is relatively complex and incurs
additional execution time. The transmitter–receiver pair is aware of the timing constraints and selects appropriate S-boxes
by keeping in view the processing time and complexity.
With the incorporation of S8 permutations, the resulting algebraic expression for the construction of the S8 Liu J S-box is
given as
f : S8 × Liu J S-box→ S8 Liu J S-box.
The elements of the Liu J S-box are processed with the application of permutation of the symmetric group S8 to each and
every constituent element in the binary form, represented by the function f . The number of possible new S-boxes is 40320
due to the inherent characteristics of the order of the group S8.
While the application of proposed algorithm synthesizes a large number of new S-boxes that can be used for several
encryption applications, it is necessary that this component must meet the stringent requirements of high nonlinearity.
In order to ensure the robustness and resistance against attacks, the new components must be analyzed thoroughly.
We apply several methods in order to analyze the performance of the proposed S-boxes and provide an insight into the
design complexity. These methods include linearity analysis, the bit independence criterion, the strict avalanche criterion,
differential approximation probability analysis and linear probability analysis. In addition, as the encryption rounds progress
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Fig. 1. The process of synthesis of Liu J S-boxes.
in a substitution permutation setup, it is important to observe and quantify the results from using these criteria. We
stimulate the encryption system in order to study the differential approximation probability and linear approximation
profanity, which enables us to uniquely determine the mapping of the differentials.
4. Analysis of S8 Liu J S-boxes
The fundamental objective of an S-box is to provide nonlinear mapping between the plaintext and the ciphertext. It is
important to rigorously analyze the nonlinearity characteristics of the new S-boxes and estimate the robustness against
attacks of the encrypted data. In order to further investigate the behavior of the mapping from plaintext to encrypted data,
we perform a series of tests and broaden our understanding of the properties exhibited by the cipher.We present the details
of these analyses and the characteristics of the newly created S-boxes.
Resistance to linear cryptanalysis: We analyze the properties of the function under analysis and the set of all affine functions.
In an effort to determine the number of bits required to change a function and reach the closest affine function, the bits
are toggled in such a way that the original function is modified. The change in properties in the function, by changing
the bits in the truth table, leads us to the nearest affine function. The linear approximation functions are determined and
concatenated in such a manner as to approximate the nonlinear function. The strength of the S-box lies in its ability to
resist an approximation from the nonlinear function, formed by concatenating linear components, estimated in the form of
small integral components. The S-box is organized in an n × n configuration, which is formed by the constituent Boolean
functions, represented as linear combinations of x and y. A number of linear functions (a subset of size 2n, defined as A) can
be synthesized that can approximate the functions used in the creation of S-boxes. An S-box of dimensions n×n is resistant
to this class of attacks from the mappings created by concatenation of functions from a set of a total of 2n(x, y) pairs. The
conditions are given below:
f (x) = g(y) ∀(x, y) ∈ A
||A| − 2n−1| ≤ 2 n2 , n(even)
||A| − 2n−1| ≤ 2 n−12 , n(odd).
On the basis of the odd or even values of n, the above expression has a different interpretation. This mapping can be fully
expressed by the pairs constituted from (x, y), represented in the set S, where the set A contains all the subsets formed by
analyzing the contents of the set S. In this case, for a good approximation, the condition that the functions of x and ymust
be equal should be fulfilled. The linear component functions, which are independent from each other in the selected set, are
combined. The strength of the cipher lies in the hampering of the assembly of these linear functions which can approximate
the original nonlinear behavior of an S-box under attack.
In order to quantify the nonlinearity of S-boxes, we perform tests on the nonlinear components under examination. The
results are shown in Table 1.
It can be seen from Table 1 that the nonlinearity of the S-box, synthesized by the symmetric group action S8 on the Liu J
S-box, has an average value of 104.87 and it is comparable to those of the other S-boxes.
The bit independence criterion.
The analysis of avalanche variables is performed using the bit independence criterion. The changes in bits at intermediate
stages, and eventually at the output, in response to a single change at the input exhibit characteristics which may help
cryptanalysts. It is also imperative to study the nonlinear characteristics of the bit independence criterion. This property is
shown in Table 2. We use binary values with the weight of 1, which corresponds to the eight rows in Table 2. The results
from using the bit independence criterion are depicted in Table 3.
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Table 1
The results of the nonlinearity analysis of eight Boolean functions in S-boxes.
S-boxes 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Average
Proposed S-Box 105 105 104 100 107 105 106 107 104.875
AES S-box 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
APA S-box 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
Gray S-box 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
S8 AES S-box 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112
Skipjack S-box 104 104 108 108 108 104 104 106 105.75
Xyi S-box 106 104 104 106 104 106 104 106 105
Residue prime 94 100 104 104 102 100 98 94 99.5
Table 2
The results from using the bit independence criterion corresponding to eight Boolean functions.
f0 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7
– 106 103 109 102 106 105 100
106 – 103 103 104 102 109 106
103 103 – 102 105 107 104 101
109 103 102 – 105 103 106 99
102 104 105 105 – 104 99 108
106 102 107 103 104 – 107 106
105 109 104 106 99 107 – 103
100 106 101 99 108 106 103 –
Table 3
The results of the BIC analysis for various S-boxes.
S-boxes Average Minimum value Square deviation
Proposed S-box 104.786 99 2.659
AES 112 112 0
APA 112 112 0
Gray 112 112 0
S8 AES 112 112 0
Skipjack 104.14 102 1.767
Xyi 103.78 98 2.743
Prime 101.71 94 3.53
Table 4
The dependent matrix in the bit independence criterion.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
– 0.503 0.503 0.509 0.522 0.498 0.486 0.541
0.503 – 0.533 0.496 0.490 0.492 0.490 0.480
0.503 0.533 – 0.496 0.509 0.496 0.500 0.486
0.509 0.496 0.496 – 0.498 0.476 0.484 0.507
0.523 0.490 0.509 0.498 – 0.468 0.513 0.515
0.498 0.492 0.496 0.476 0.468 – 0.498 0.492
0.486 0.490 0.500 0.484 0.513 0.498 – 0.515
0.541 0.480 0.486 0.507 0.515 0.492 0.515 –
The resulting numerical values for the proposed S8 Liu J S-box are within an acceptable range and are comparable with
those for other S-boxes used for analysis in this paper.
The dependence matrix for the bit independence criterion is shown in Table 4. It can be seen from this table that the
minimum and maximum values of the results are 0.468 and 0.523, respectively.
A comparison of bit independence criteria for different S-boxes is shown in Table 5. The performance of the proposed
S-box is in agreement with the results of the analysis for various S-boxes tested for performance.
The values of the proposed S-box are close to optimal numbers, showing its resistance to attacks.
Avalanche characteristics.
The study of bit patterns yielded by the avalanche effect, induced by the application of substitution–permutation
operation in the encryption process, yields useful information about the properties of a cipher and in particular its strength.
The strict avalanche criterion (SAC) [12] is used to analyze the properties of output bit values resulting from a single change
or multiple changes at input bits. The SAC applies to the analysis of each of the output bits, that is, the probability for a bit
to toggle is 0.5 for each output bit in response to a single change at an input bit.
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Table 5
Comparison of the dependent matrices of BIC with different S-boxes.
S-boxes Average Minimum Square deviation
Proposed S-box 0.489 0.468 0.016
AES 0.504 0.48 0.011
APA 0.499 0.472 0.01
Gray 0.502 0.478 0.01
S8 AES 0.502 0.478 0.01
Skipjack 0.499 0.464 0.018
Xyi 0.503 0.47 0.015
Prime 0.502 0.47 0.017
Table 6
SAC for eight constituent Boolean functions (with the proposed S-box).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.539 0.492 0.546 0.562 0.507 0.492 0.515 0.476
0.539 0.476 0.546 0.453 0.492 0.507 0.468 0.445
0.492 0.492 0.531 0.468 0.492 0.492 0.453 0.445
0.507 0.445 0.531 0.500 0.460 0.492 0.546 0.429
0.554 0.476 0.484 0.500 0.507 0.507 0.468 0.507
0.445 0.554 0.468 0.500 0.554 0.445 0.531 0.492
0.492 0.507 0.484 0.515 0.445 0.523 0.531 0.507
0.460 0.554 0.546 0.515 0.523 0.585 0.453 0.492
Table 7
Strict avalanche criteria for various S-boxes.
S-boxes Maximum Minimum Average Square deviation
Proposed S-box 0.585 0.429 0.499 0.0177
AES 0.562 0.453 0.504 0.0156
APA 0.562 0.437 0.5 0.016
Gray 0.562 0.437 0.499 0.015
S8 AES 0.562 0.453 0.504 0.0156
Skipjack 0.593 0.39 0.503 0.024
Xyi 0.609 0.406 0.502 0.022
Prime 0.671 0.343 0.516 0.032
The results from SAC are shown in Table 6. These results range from a maximum of 0.585 to a minimum of 0.429, with
an average value of 0.499. The average results from the SAC analysis yield a value very close to the optimal value of 0.5.
A comparison of SAC for different S-boxes used as benchmarks in this work is presented in Table 7. It is observed that the
result for the proposed S-box is very close to the desired value of 0.5. The same trend is seen for the other S-boxes presented
for comparison.
Differential approximation probability.
The behavior and properties which result from the changing of or applying of a differential attack at the input and
observing the differential at the output are studied in order to determine the uniformity. In the substitution–permutation
network, the effects of changes applied at the input are observed through intermediate stages at the output. The nonlinear
behavior can be observed from the differential at different stages. If a linear behavior is observed or if an encryption process
is not at par in creating randomness, the cipher can be modeled by linear functions. The input differential is represented by
1xi and the corresponding output differential is given as1yi. The differential approximation probability method is applied
to an S-box and the expression is represented as
DP
s
(1x → 1y) =

#{x ∈ X/S(x)⊕ S(x⊕1x) = 1y}
2m

.
The differential approximation probability results for the proposed S-box, that is, the S8 Liu J S-box are shown in Table 8.
It is seen that the differential approximation probability has a maximum value of 0.0390 for the new S-box.
A comparison of the maximum differential approximation probabilities for various S-boxes is presented in Table 9.
Although the value of the maximum differential approximation probability is higher for the proposed S-box as compared to
AES, APA, S8, and Gray, it is comparable with those for Skipjack and Xyi.
Linear approximation probability.
The imbalance of an event is determined with the use of the linear approximation probability method. Several bit masks
are applied at the input bits in order to determine and study the patterns at the output bits. These masks are represented as
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Table 8
Differential approximation probabilities.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0.015 0.015 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015
0.023 0.015 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015
0.031 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.023
0.031 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.023
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.039 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.015 0.023 0.015 0.023
0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.031
0.015 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.031 0.023 0.015 0.031 0.031 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023
0.031 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.031 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.031
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015
0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.023
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
0.023 0.023 0.031 0.023 0.015 0.031 0.023 0.015 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
0.023 0.031 0.023 0.023 0.015 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 –
Table 9
Differential approximation probabilities (DP) for various S-boxes.
S-boxes Proposed Box AES APA Gray S8 AES Skipjack Xyi Prime
Max DP 0.0390 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0156 0.0468 0.0468 0.281
Table 10
Linear approximation probabilities (LP) for various S-boxes.
S-boxes Proposed Box AES APA Gray S8 AES Skipjack Xyi Prime
Max LP 0.105 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.109 0.156 0.132
Max value 159 144 144 144 144 156 168 162
Table 11
Results of statistical analyses used in the generalized majority logic criterion.
S-boxes Entropy Contrast Correlation Energy Homogeneity MAD
AES 7.73018 7.322085 0.087904 0.024477 0.483523 36.3631
APA 7.688383 7.736859 0.216816 0.022942 0.486265 39.58588
Gray 7.694494 7.658869 0.169512 0.023721 0.48301 41.15375
Proposed S-box 7.73018 7.322085 0.087904 0.024477 0.483523 36.3631
Prime 7.65955 6.368367 0.099634 0.026099 0.49848 36.3082
S8 AES 7.709484 8.168543 0.230963 0.022708 0.487036 43.56603
Skipjack 7.673853 6.805101 0.195849 0.026131 0.495087 41.08565
Xyi 7.685079 7.065226 0.138465 0.031036 0.492867 27.49743
Γ x and Γ y. The probability of the bias or the linear approximation probability is determined as
LP = max
Γ x,Γ y≠0
#{x/x · Γ x = S(x) · Γ y}2n − 12
 .
All possible inputs are represented in a set X with the cardinality of 2n elements.
The linear approximation probability results are shown in Table 10. A comparisonwith other S-boxes used as benchmarks
in this work is presented.
5. Generalized majority logic criteria
The majority logic criterion is used to select an S-box for the encryption of data of a particular type [13]. The process of
selection relies on the statistical data generated by analyses of several types (see Table 11 for example), performed on the
encrypted version as well as the original data. The results of the analyses used in the generalized majority logic criterion
are the entropy, contrast, correlation, energy, homogeneity, and mean of the absolute deviation (MAD) analysis results.
The amount of distortion in the original data can be quantized with the use of results from these analyses. In essence, the
generalized majority logic criterion identifies the best S-box, suitable for the encryption of data of a particular type. The
application of S-boxes to the image of Lena is shown in Fig. 2. The effects of the nonlinear substitution can be observed by
visually examining the transformed images resulting from the original image. The corresponding histograms are also shown
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Fig. 2. Image encryption by the use of different S-boxes.
Fig. 3. Histogram of the original and encrypted images.
in Fig. 3. The histogram characteristics of the data, before and after the encryption, can be used to analyze the strength
of the cipher. The encrypted data from different transformations have varying characteristics, which are identified by the
application of the majority logic criterion.
6. The utility of S8 Liu J S-boxes
In further studies of the properties of the proposed S-box, we determine the utility and analyze the synthesis process.
The advantage of creating 40320 boxes is also studied and the implications of the availability of such a high number of
I. Hussain et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 64 (2012) 2450–2458 2457
Fig. 4. Algorithm for generating the S8 Liu J S-box.
key generations are also discussed. In a communication system, the process of key generation needs to be automated to
facilitate the integration of the newmechanism. The process begins with the translation of plaintext into its corresponding
polynomials,which are transformed through the newly generated S-box. The S-box is permuted for the next input; therefore,
the possibility of encrypting data in a round with a similar transformation is least probable. The details of this algorithm are
shown in Fig. 4.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present amethod for constructing 40320 keys to be used in the encryption process. The keys are applied
to the existing Liu J S-box, which is commonly used as a nonlinear component in encryption processes. The new S-boxes
are created by the permutation operation of the symmetric group S8 on the Liu J S-box elements. The proposed S-boxes are
analyzed for their performance and resistance to cryptanalysis by using statistical analysis. The proposed S-boxes are easy
to synthesize by using only a single group action function. Several well known criteria/methods are used to determine the
encryption strength of the proposed S-box and a comprehensive analysis of the properties is presented. Finally, a generalized
majority logic criterion is applied to the new S-boxes and their suitability for a particular application is determined.
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